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IslamOnline: From Friend to Foe By Omer bin Abdullah 12/10/2001 1:28 am Fri |
http://www.islam-online.net/English/Views/2001/10/article1.shtml
02/10/2001 By Omer bin Abdullah In 1848, Lord Palmerston, later to be prime minister of England, told the House of
Commons: "We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests
are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow."
Hamid Mir, editor of Pakistan's influential Urdu-language daily newspaper Ausaf,
writing in The Friday Times (Lahore, Pakistan) says that in October 1995 the
California-based Unocal oil company signed a protocol with the government of
Turkmenistan to explore prospects of constructing an oil pipeline to Pakistan
through Afghan territory. When the Taliban captured Kabul, the vice-president of
Unocal, Christopher Taggart, confidently stated "we regard it as very positive." He
added that if the U.S. followed Pakistan's example of cementing ties with the
Taliban, this would open opportunities for them. Robert Oakley, former U.S.
ambassador in Pakistan, was in due course hired by Unocal for lobbying its cause
and was busy shuttling between Washington and Islamabad.
Dennis Kux, a retired senior diplomat who has served in the region, in his book The
United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies (The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2001) says that also in October 1995, former prime minister
Benazir Bhutto's Interior Minister, Maj. Gen (Retd) Naseerullah Khan Babar,
personally led a convoy of trucks from Quetta to Turkmenistan, passing through
Kandahar and Heart; and several envoys, including U.S. ambassador John Monjo, were
in the party. Kux adds that the State Department found "nothing objectionable" when
the Taliban captured Kabul, and points out that among the factors explaining the
State Department's reaction was the view that peace in Afghanistan would greatly
improve the prospects for a large gas-pipeline project involving a consortium led
by Unocal, a major American oil company that wanted to deliver Turkmen gas to India
and Pakistan. Mir says that Bhutto told him a few days after her November 6, 1996, sacking that
the U.S. ambassador in Islamabad, Thomas W. Simons, was not happy with her because
the Taliban had refused to oblige Unocal. On November 16, 1996, U.S. assistant
secretary of state Robin Raphel argued at a U.N. conference on Afghanistan in New
York that the Taliban were a completely indigenous movement, adding that the
Taliban's policies may reflect "extremism" but the best way to moderate them was to
engage them. She later went to Kandahar and met with top Taliban officials, but the
policy of engagement failed because the Taliban signed a memorandum of
understanding with Bridas, an Argentinean oil company, to develop the proposed gas
pipeline. Babar, according to Mir, questioned him for criticizing the Taliban. Mir says that
in his first meeting, he learned from Taliban chief Mulla Umar that he was unaware
that the Americans were funding the pipeline because all he knew was that his
support came from Pakistan. Mir says that he learned that Americans had a
three-point agenda for the Taliban. One, they would like to use the Taliban against
Iran. Two, they would like to pressurize them to arrange shelter and training camps
in Afghanistan for the Uyghur mujahideen [fighters] of China's Xiniang province.
And three, the Americans wanted to build a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to
Pakistan through Afghanistan. However, Mir says that he sensed the Americans would
not be able to achieve even a single objective because the Taliban were not the
kind to take dictation from them.
Kux writes that to coordinate assistance with the Taliban, Babar set up an Afghan
desk in the interior ministry. Mir's questioning of Babar indicates the Taliban
were supported by the Benazir's regime, and given the prime ministerial spouse's
deep interest in benefiting from all business deals, it would be interesting to
investigate what, if any, take was garnered by Asif Ali Zardari, Benazir's husband.
Mullah Umar, says Mir, is convinced the Americans are not interested in Osama bin
Laden and that their real objective is to install a government of their own choice
in Kabul that will allow them to take control of all road links to Central Asia.
Thus, Umar feels that the U.S. clearly wants to create difficulties, not only for
Pakistan and China, but also for Iran. Ahmed Rashid, in his book Taliban: Militant
Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (Yale University Press; March 2000)
also dwells on the Unocal/Bridas competition over natural gas fields and pipeline
politics in Central Asia. Humayum Gauhar writing in the Nation, (Sept. 23) said, "the CIA fertilized their
[Taliban] seed in the womb of the ISI [Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence], and
Saudi intelligence played midwife. The Taliban were programmed to be a thorn in the
side of Iran who would hold Afghanistan together. Instead, as all groups imbued
with ideological or religious zeal will, they went their own way and turned on
their creators." Mir says that it was only after the eight billion dollar pipeline project became a
non-starter that the Americans created an issue out of bin Laden, demanding his
extradition, which the Taliban refused, signaling that they were an independent
force. Franz Schurmann, in his article, "Afghanistan's Taliban Rebels Blend Islam and
Maoism" (Pacific News Service, Sept. 30,1996), wrote, "Ironically, Washington's
first reaction to the Taliban victory was mildly favorable, largely because of the
Taliban's deep animosity towards Iran."
For its part, the Northern Alliance is represented by a confederation backed by
Iran, Russia, India, Turkey, and others, and includes pro-communist Afghan General
Rashid Dostum. Pakistan has taken steps to preserve its interests, especially after witnessing the
close collaboration between former Afghan president (1992-1996)Burhanuddin Rabbani
and India, Russia and Iran, compromising Pakistani influence. Irrespective of the
Northern Alliance's public stance, its leadership has actively sought Pakistan's
intervention to initiate an intra-Afghan dialogue.
The Islamabad Accord, signed by all Afghan parties in 1993, remains a testimony to
Islamabad's commitment to a genuine homegrown peace process in Afghanistan. It was
under this accord that Sibghatullah Mujadidi became the President in Kabul for six
months. However, when he hesitated in vacating the presidency for Rabbani, Pakistan
forced him to step down. Mir maintains, however, that when Rabbani's term was up,
and in violation of the accord, he refused to step down, reportedly with the
encouragement of Washington and Moscow. And after Pakistan's embassy in Kabul was
attacked, added with Rabbani's refusal to implement the Islamabad Accord, Pakistan
was forced to support the Taliban - an outfit Pakistanis had used to protect their
trade route to Central Asia from marauding tribals.
Most Pakistanis agree that the Taliban's leaders are semi-literate products of
seminaries that espouse an interpretation of Islam that is not adhered to by the
vast majority of Pakistanis or one billion Muslims. Their understanding of the true
spirit of Islam is patchy at best, non-existent at worst, and has nothing
whatsoever to do with the enlightenment, tolerance and justice practiced in Medina
by Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). And Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf has had a puzzling relationship with
the Taliban. Only days after the attacks in the U.S., he astonished the U.N. by
sending a message of condolence to Mullah Omar on the death of his deputy, Mullah
Mohammed Rabbani, declaring that Rabbani had been a "loyal friend of Pakistan". He
then distanced himself from the Taliban, telling Herald magazine, a Pakistani
weekly, "They are fiercely independent." The General also said that 99% of the
country is being "held hostage" by religious extremists who constitute just one
percent of the population. If Mir's statement is to be accepted, then the Taliban have struck to the Pakistani
position that despite their Islamic credentials, they refused to support an
anti-Chinese movement (one of the three points mentioned above), and that this is
what Pakistan is presently doing. Mir argues that the Taliban are not opportunists,
and despite their many faults and follies, they have become a defense line for
Pakistan and China. Also, according to Mir, a Saudi organization was seeking the
Taliban's support against China. Considering the alleged influence of bin Laden and
his opposition to communism, it would have been easy. However, the Taliban refused.
In his address to the nation explaining his acceptance of an American request for
support, Musharraf said: "The Indians want to ensure, if and when there is a change
of government in Afghanistan, it should be an anti-Pakistan government."
David Rohde of the New York Times (September 25, 2001), says, "While [Northern]
alliance officials here put on a brave face, doubts exist about its military
abilities. The group claims to field 15,000 soldiers, but Russian officials say the
number is closer to 5,000. They claim to control 15% of northwest Afghanistan;
Russian officials put the figure at five percent." Rohde adds: "The alliance has
also been accused of drug and gunrunning and human rights violations, including
summary executions, the burning of houses and looting. Most of the targets were
ethnic Pashtuns, a base of Taliban support." Similar charges exist against the
Taliban. Even if Pakistani accounts are accepted that the Northern Alliance, also called the
United Front, may have 8,000 to 10,000 fighters, their military strength is so
limited that in normal circumstances they would never have thought of uprooting the
Taliban from Kabul. The British media reports that elite British troops are
fighting alongside Northern Alliance forces may have unsettled many Pakistanis,
fearing that a force they have opposed is advancing in their north, especially a
force that has active Indian support. Most Pakistanis are deeply concerned over such developments, especially with the
imminent scenario in which the Taliban may be replaced by a North Alliance
government, which is being touted by some as an outfit that favors a multiparty
government. The Northern Alliance has long been backed by powers as disparate as
Russia and Iran. Moscow supports the group because it blames the Taliban for
supporting the struggle against the Russian occupation of the republic of Chechnya,
and Iran opposes the Taliban because of their non-acceptance of the Shi'a school of
thought. According to Pakistani reports, at a recent ministerial-level meeting in the Tajik
capital of Dushanbe, India participated in negotiations with the Central Asian
Republic, bordering Afghanistan, and Iran. India was represented by none other than
deputy minister for external affairs Omar Abdullah, son of Farooq Abdullah, the
Indian-puppet chief minister in Indian-Occupied Kashmir. The follow-up to the
ministerial meeting in Dushanbe was also attended, and dominated, by, Ahmed Shah
Massoud's successor Gen. Mohammad Fahim and Abdullah Abdullah, the Northern
Alliance's foreign minister. Lt. Gen. (ret.) Salahuddin Tirmizi, a former corps commander and
commandant-military of Pakistan's National Defense College is reported to have said
that Pakistan's military strategy cannot afford a hostile government in Afghanistan
that will force it to make crucial realignments in troop deployment, adding that
even a semblance of Northern Alliance's dominance over Afghanistan would make
Pakistan uncomfortable. Understandably, Pakistan seeks "strategic depth" to maintain a friendly regime in
the north so that its entire attention can be focused towards India. The "strategic
depth" is not a fallback position, but a strategy to be free from dispersing its
troops on more borders than one. |